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Article 2

MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS
In a motion or petition to suppress evidence a respondent
accused of crime invokes the aid of the court against a
claimed violation of his constitutional rights, and to prevent
the use against him of evidence which he claims was unlawfully obtained. While not the only manner of presenting
the matter to the court, such motions or petitions provide a
simple method of procedure, which in the great majority of
cases is fully adequate.
Reference to a few historical facts may not be out of
place. Among the grievances which ultimately led to American independence was the exaction of duties upon imports.
From this distance we may safely admit that some patriots
evaded them. Such evasion was more or less a matter of
principle, and was a fairly effective protest against taxation
without representation. One of the outrages which became
unbearable was the flagrant disregard of the rights of citizens
in the searching for smuggled goods, by virtue of so-called
Writs of Assistance.
These writs had their origin in the Statute, 13 and 14
Car. 2, Chapter 11, Section 5, which, among other things,
purported to authorize the issuance of Writs of Assistance,
to command the examination of ships and vessels and persons found therein, for the purpose of finding goods, the
importation or exportation of which was prohibited, and to
authorize the officers charged with their enforcement to enter into and search any suspected vaults, cellars or warehouses for such goods.
The practice had obtained in the Colonies of issuing Writs
of Assistance to the revenue officers empowering them, in
their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled
goods, thus leaving the matter of the search of a particular
place to the discretion of the officer. It was this practice
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which James Otis pronounced "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and
the fundamental principles of law, that was ever found in
an English law book," since they placed "the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer." At about
the same time the controversy between John Wilkes and the
British government was raging. Among the abuses which
had crept into the administration of public affairs in Great
Britain was the practice of issuing general warrants by the
Secretary of State, for searching private houses, and the
discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be
used to convict their owner of the charge of libel. The decision in the case of Entick v. Carrington,' which decision
was handed down in 1765, was naturally well known to
American statesmen as was indeed the history of the entire
controversy.
With these facts and the causes of the War of the Revolution in mind, it becomes apparent that the Bill of Rights was
added to the Constitution for the express purpose of preventing such abuses.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The Fifth Amendment provides in part:
"No person shall . . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."

In the application of these provisions of the Bill of Rights
and particularly in their application to the National Prohibition Act, we have had the extremists on the one hand who
could vision neither inconsistency nor danger in scrapping the
Constitution in order to more strictly enforce a particular
1 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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law; and we have had those other extremists who seem to
look upon the Constitution as a screen or barrier behind
which commercialized law-breaking might function with impunity. Those in the one group have not realized that the
Natural Rights of Man, which the Bill of Rights was designed to safeguard, are more vitally important than the enforcement of a particular statute could possibly become.
The members of the other group have not realized that one
of the objects of the Constitution is to establish justice.
To the credit of our institutions it may properly be recorded that the courts of the United States seem to have
found no great difficulty in maintaining the safeguards of the
Bill of Rights in all their vigor and at the same time preventing their becoming a tacit permission to commit crime.
Searches and seizures without search warrants are not necessarily unreasonable. (a) An officer lawfully upon premises may lawfully seize property of the government or smuggled property or counterfeit money or intoxicating liquor
unlawfully possessed, which comes to his attention. (b) He
may lawfully search an automobile or other vehicle or conveyance upon probable cause to believe that it contains smuggled property or intoxicating liquor, and he may seize the
contraband goods. (c) He may lawfully, as incident to a
lawful arrest, search the person of his prisoner and the premises where the arrest is made, and seize all goods and articles
used or kept for use in the commission of the crime.
These powers are essential to the right of the Government
to defend itself against crime. They are proper and reasonable. They are not within the prohibition of the Fourth
Amendment, that being against only such searches and seizures as are unreasonable. This enumeration is merely illustrative. An exhaustive discussion of that phase of the
subject is impossible here.
One standard textbook on
searches and seizures contains 1,100 pages without covering
every possible question.
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Strictly speaking, perhaps, this discussion should be confined to motions in the district courts. There is, however,
a matter within the jurisdiction of United States commissioners which should be noticed. This jurisdiction is purely
statutory and is confined within narrow limits. It has its
origin in the statute under which the United States commissioner commonly issues search warrants, and applies only
to searches and seizures under search warrants issued by him.
It cannot with entire accuracy be said to have for its object
the protection of rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, but is rather intended to prevent abuses of the statute
permitting the issuance of search warrants. The ultimate
effect, however, of such procedure before the commissioner
is to protect against violations of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
The statute under which search warrants are usually (but
not always) issued is the Act of June 15, 1917, commonly
called the Espionage Act. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments naturally govern all searches and seizures, with a
warrant or without a warrant. In the issuance of a search
warrant the same rules apply as in the issuance of any other
warrant. The person who makes the complaint, or affidavit,
must state facts showing probable cause for the issuance of
the warrant. All mere conclusions must be disregarded.
The commissioner or court issuing the warrant and not the
one applying for it must determine whether the requisite
probable cause exists to believe that the property to be
searched for is being possessed contrary to law.
Ordinarily the question of whether a search or seizure is
in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be determined
by the district court. The commissioner who issued the
warrant has no jurisdiction or authority, except as given by
statute, to pass upon any motion, the object of which is to
suppress evidence. The commissioner in fact is not ordinarily deemed a judicial officer.
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He is, however, by sections 15 and 16 of the Espionage
Act, given a limited jurisdiction with regard to search warrants already issued by him. The issuance of a search warrant is a purely ex parte proceeding. The person who claims
that his rights have been violated by a search or seizure has
no opportunity to raise any question in that regard until
after the search and seizure are made. It is provided in section 15 of the Espionage Act that if the grounds upon which
the warrant was issued be controverted, the judge or commissioner who issued the search warrant must proceed to
take testimony in relation thereto, and the testimony of each
witness must be reduced to writing and subscribed by such
witness. Section 16 provides that if it appears that the
property or paper taken was not the same as that described
in the warrant, or where there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds upon which the warrant is issued, the judge or commissioner who issues the
warrant shall cause such property or paper to be restored
to the person from whom it was taken. It should be noted
in this connection that where the facts upon which probable
cause was founded are controverted, the burden of proving
their falsity is upon the person controverting them.
It
should also be noted that the provision in section 16 for
the return of the property taken does not apply in all cases.
Where the property taken was unlawfully possessed, the
courts have held that the commissioner has no authority
to order it returned.
The foregoing are the only matters upon which a search
warrant can be attacked before a commissioner. All other
attacks upon search warrants and all attacks upon searches
or seizures made without a warrant must be made before
the district court. The commissioner has no inherent or
common-law power to suppress evidence gained through
search warrant, and has no power or jurisdiction whatever
to suppress evidence obtained without a search warrant.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Judge Cooper, of the District Court for the Northern District of New York, expressed these rules as to the discretion
and jurisdiction of the commissioner as follows:'
"In determining the existence of probable cause, he exercises a discretion judicial in its nature. Veeder v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 252 F. 414;
U. S. v. Elliot (C. C. A.) 5 F. (2d) 292. He undoubtedly exercises
like discretion, judicial in its nature, when he entertains a proceeding
to controvert the ground on which the search warrant was granted,
and decides whether or not there is probable cause for believing the
existence of the ground on which the search warrant was issued. But
at both times, and at all times, his power is granted by sections 625
and 626 of title 18, and limited by title 2, § 25, of the Prohibition
Law. He has no inherent or common-law power with reference to
issuing or quashing search warrants. U. S. v. Jones (D. C.) 230 F.
262, 265, supra."
"The statutory rights granted by sections 625 and 626 must not be
confused with the constitutional guaranties of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Sections 625 and 626 were
not enacted until 1917, but the rights granted by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments have existed since the adoption of these amendments. It
is the duty of the courts to enforce these constitutional rights, but
the commissioner has no power in respect thereto.
"The defendant's right to inquire into the legality of the seizure,
and the competence of evidence against him of the things seized, is
not confined to the rights given by section 626, nor limited to application to the commissioner, even while the commissioner has jurisdiction
or authority. Independent of statute, the defendant may apply to the
court, but not to a commissioner, for inquiry into probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant, the legality of the seizure, whether
with or without search warrant, the competence of the seized articles
as evidence, and for an order directing the return of the seized articles.
All of this is in the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the
defendant. This, unlike the power granted to the commissioner under
sections 625 and 626, is a continuing one."

A motion or petition to suppress evidence must be made
and filed in the district court. It is not essential that a
prosecution in that court be then pending. Although apparently seldom done, it is nevertheless possible to make a motion or a petition in district court to suppress evidence which
2

United States v. Napela, 28 Fed. (2d)

898, 900, 903 (1928).
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is about to be used against the petitioner in proceedings
pending before a commissioner. This is because the commissioner is an officer of the court and the court has supervisory power over him. In such case the district court may
upon proper proceedings suppress the evidence and it cannot thereafter be used before the commissioner. This, however, seems to be a rather exceptional use of motion or petition to suppress. The proceeding ordinarily takes place after the actual commencement of the prosecution in district
court.
Certain things are necessary to a proper motion or petition: (a) It must allege facts which show that the rights
of the petitioner, under the Fourth Amendment, have been
violated by an unlawful search of his person or property
or an unlawful seizure of his property, papers or effects.
It has been held that the petition must also show that the
premises searched were in the possession of the petitioner
or that the property, papers or effects were taken from his
possession. (b) It must also allege that it is intended to
use the property, papers or effects seized or the information
obtained in and about such unlawful search or seizure or
both as evidence against the petitioner. (c) The showing
as to these matters must be by allegations of fact and not of
mere conclusions. (d) The petition or motion for the suppression of evidence must be a timely one.
This last requisite has received so much attention in the
decided cases and has been the subject of so much confusion
and misunderstanding that a more extended discussion will
not be out of place.
It has been given particular consideration in the following
decisions of the Supreme Court: Adams v. New York; 3
Weeks v. United States;4 Gouled.v. United States;5 Amos
3

192 U. S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575 (1903).
4 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B 834, Ann. Cas.
1915C 1177 (1913).
5 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1920).
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v. United States;6 Agnello v. United States;7 and Segurola
v. United States.8
All these decisions go to the question of what is necessary
in order that a motion or petition to suppress (or an objection to evidence) in a particular case may be considered
timely.
In the Adams case the court said:
"No objection was taken at the trial to the introduction of the testimony of the officers holding the search warrant as to the seizure of the
policy slips; the objection raised was to receiving in evidence certain
private papers. These papers became important as tending to show
the custody by the plaintiff in error, with knowledge, of the policy
slips. The question was not made in the attempt to resist an unlawful seizure of the private papers of the plaintiff in error, but arose
upon objection to the introduction of testimony clearly competent as
tending to establish the guilt of the accused of the offense charged. In
such cases the weight of authority as well as reason limits the inquiry
to the competency of the proffered testimony, and the courts do not
stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was obtained.
The rule is thus laid down in Greenleaf (vol. 1, § 254a):
"'It may be mentioned in this place that though papers and other
subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken from the possession
of the party against whom they are offered, or otherwise unlawfully
obtained, this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are
pertinent to the issue. The court will not take notice how they were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to
determine that question.'
"The author is supported by numerous cases."

It should be noted, however, that this decision also goes
further by way of discussion and uses language which might
be considered as holding that in no case could the defendant
protect himself upon his trial against evidence obtained
through an unconstitutional search or seizure. This language
appears to have been so understood by lawyers generally,
and was evidently so understood by the Department of
Justice. In the Weeks case it was contended by the Govern6
7

255 U. S. 313, 65 L. Ed. 654, 41 S. Ct. 266 (1920).

269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925).
8 275 U. S. 106, 48 S. Ct. 77, 72 L. Ed. 186 (1927).
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ment that, the letters in question having come into the control of the court, the court would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but, if competent, would
keep them and permit their use as evidence.
In the Weeks case, after the defendant had been arrested
by police officers and after they had taken possession of certain papers and articles, the United States marshal searched
the defendant's room for additional evidence and carried
away certain letters and envelopes which he found in the
drawer of a chiffonier. He had no search warrant. A petition was made that the trial court order the return of these
papers so seized by the marshal (which petition also asked
the return of the property seized by the police officers).
Upon consideration of the petition the court directed the return of such property as was not pertinent to the charge
against the defendant, but denied the petition as to pertinent matter, reserving the right to pass upon the pertinency
at a later time. In disposing of the matter, the court said:
"We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were
taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United States,
acting under color of his office, in direct violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendant; that having made a seasonable application for
their return, which was heard and passed upon by the court, there was
involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored
these letters to the accused. In holding them and permitting their

use upon the trial we think prejudicial error was committed."
In the Gouled case two matters were involved:

(a) Papers were taken without defendant's knowledge
and he did not learn that they had been taken and were in
the possession of the Government until a Government witness, one Cohen, took the stand and testified to the taking
of the papers. Objection was then made to the admission
of the papers in evidence. It was held: (1) that the taking
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) that
the objection under those circumstances was not too late
though made during the course of the trial, because made
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upon the first knowledge the defendant had that the Government was in possession of the papers. In disposing of
that question, the court said:
"The facts derived from the certificate, essential to be considered in
answering the first two questions, are: that in January, 1918, it was
suspected that the defendant Gouled, and Vaughan were conspiring to
defraud the government through contracts with it for clothing and
equipment; that one Cohen, a private in the Army, attached to the
Intelligence Department, and a business acquaintance of defendant,
Gouled, under directions of his superior officers, pretending to make a
friendly call upon the defendant, gained admission to his office and
in his absence, without warrant of any character, seized and carried
away several documents; that one of these papers, described as 'of
evidential value only,' and belonging to Gouled, was subsequently delivered to the United States district attorney, and was by him introduced in evidence over the objection of the defendant that possession
of it was obtained by a violation of the 4th or 5th Amendment to the
Constitution; and that the defendant did not know that Cohen had
carried away any of his papers until he appeared on the witness stand
and detailed the facts with respect thereto as we have stated them,
when, necessarily, objection was first made to the admission of the
paper in evidence.
"Out of these facts arise the first two questions, both relating to
the paper thus seized. The first of these is:
"'Is the secret taking, without force, from the house or office of
one suspected of crime, of a paper belonging to him, of evidential
value only, by a representative of any branch or subdivision of the
government of the United States, a violation of the 4th Amendment?'
"The ground on which the trial court overruled the objection to this
paper is not stated, but from the certificate and the argument we must
infer that it was admitted, either because it appeared that the possession of it was obtained without the use of force or illegal coercion,
or because the objection to it came too late.
"The objection was not too late, for, coming as it did promptly
upon the first notice the defendant had that the government was in
possession of- the paper, the rule of practice relied upon, that such an
objection will not be entertained unless made before trial, was obviously inapplicable."
"The second question reads:
" 'Is the admission of such paper in evidence against the same person when indicted for crime a violation of the 5th Amendment?'
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"Upon authority of the Boyd Case, supra, this second question must
also be answered in the affirmative. In practice the result is the
same to one accused of crime, whether he be obliged to supply evidence
against himself or whether such evidence be obtained by an illegal
search of his premises and seizure of his private papers. In either
case he is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the 5th Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal 'case."

(b) In that case papers having evidential value only
and in which the Government had no other interest were
taken under a search warrant issued under the Espionage
Act. A motion was made before trial for the return of
these papers, the granting of which would necessarily have
suppressed them as evidence. The motion was denied and
the case came on for trial before another judge. Objection
was made to the introduction of the papers in evidence and
the trial judge held that he was bound by the decision of the
motion. Here, as said by the court, it must have become apparent during the trial that the papers had been unconstitutionally seized and it was held that when this appeared and
objection was made the court should have considered the
objection upon its merits and not have depended upon any
ruling as to timeliness of motion. In that regard the court
said:
"It is plain that the trial court acted upon the rule, widely adopted,
that courts in criminal trials will not pause to determine how the possession of evidence tendered has been obtained. While this is a rule
of great practical importance, yet, after all, it is only a rule of procedure and therefore it is not to be applied as a hard-and-fast formula
to every case, regardless of its special circumstances. We think rather
that it is a rule to be used to secure the ends of justice under the circumstances presented by each case, and where, in the progress of a
trial, it becomes probable that there has been an unconstitutional
seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial court to entertain an objection to their admission or a motion for their exclusion and to consider and decide the question as then presented, even where a motion
to return the papers may have been denied before trial. A rule of
practice must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over
a constitutional right.
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"In the case we are considering, the certificate shows that a motion
to return the papers, seized under the search warrants, was made before the trial and was denied, and that on the trial of the case before another judge, this ruling was treated as conclusive, although, as
we have seen, in the progress of the trial it must have become apparent that the papers had been unconstitutionally seized. The constitutional objection having been renewed, under the circumstances,
the court should have inquired as to the origin of the possession of the
papers when they were offered in evidence against the defendant."

In the Amos case, decided the same day as the Gouled
case, it was held: (a) that the petition for return of property (which would result in suppression of evidence) was
timely though not made until after the jury was sworn; and
(b) that the Government's own evidence showed the search
to have been made in violation of the constitutional safeguards; that the petition for return of property should therefore have been granted and the motion to exclude the property and testimony should have been sustained. The
Gouled case is cited as authority. The Agnello case is in
line with the Gouled and Amos cases.
These decisions seem to have caused a considerable amount
of confusion in that they were taken to mean that the Supreme Court had rejected entirely the rule of the Adams
case, recognized in the Weeks case, that a motion to suppress must be timely. This confusion is reflected in the
case of Ganci v. United States,9 decided by the Court of
Appeals of the Second Circuit in 1923. It was there held
that a motion to exclude evidence may be made and must
be entertained at any time prior to verdict, and the Gouled
and Amos cases are cited as authority. The Ganci case
was without question correctly decided, but it is suggested
that the decision might more properly have been placed upon the ground that the uncontroverted evidence of the Government showed the search and seizure to be in violation
of the Constitution, and that, therefore, upon the offering
9 287 Fed. 60 (1923).
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of the evidence obtained thereby, an objection to the evidence should have been sustained and a motion to strike out
the oral testimony should have been granted.
The matter is clarified by the opinion rendered by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 6th Circuit, in Salata v. United
States,"° in which the court, in deciding the matter, says:
"It is clear from the uncontradicted testimony of the federal prohibition agent, Beilstein, that this search warrant was not issued by any
one having authority to issue the same, nor, as required by statute,
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit.
"The objection to the introduction of this liquor in evidence was
overruled by the trial court, for the reason that the objection to the
validity of the search warrant and the application for re-delivery of
the liquor to Salata were not made within a reasonable time after the
alleged illegal seizure, and that, therefore, the court was not required
to halt the trial to determine the collateral issue of whether evidence,
otherwise competent, had been unlawfully acquired. Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575; Weeks v. U. S.,
232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834,
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177; U. S. v. O'Dowd (D. C.) 273 Fed. 600.
"While there does not appear to be any conflict in the authorities
in reference to this general rule, yet in.this particular case the defendant's objection to the admission in evidence of the property taken
and testimony concerning the same, tendered no collateral issue of
fact because the facts were not in dispute. These facts were disclosed
to the court by the uncontradicted testimony of the government's witness, the federal prohibition agent, who had procured the warrant and
made the search and seizure.
"The question here presented is substantially the same question,
arising upon practically the same state of facts as the question decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in Amos v. U. S. .

It therefore appears that the rule requiring motion before trial ordinarily applies only to cases where the question of the validity of search or seizure involves a question
of fact; that where the invalidity appears affirmatively from
the evidence introduced by the Government, the court upon
proper objection will rule out the evidence. The decision
of the Ganci casq that a motion to suppress may be made
at any time before verdict is against the great weight of
authority. The following later decisions, among others, are
10

286 Fed. 125 (1923).
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to the contrary: MacDaniel v. United States; Winkle v.
United States; 2 Tucker v. United States;" Landwirth v.
United States; 4 and Harkline v. United States. 5 These
cases were decided after the Gouled and Amos cases. All
of them disagree with the Ganci case. Substantially all of
them contain language which would indicate that the right
to suppress evidence may be waived by undue delay in the
making of a motion to suppress, even though the facts which
show the search or seizure unconstitutional are not denied
and are a part of the Government's case.
It is, however, to be regarded as extremely doubtful
whether, in view of the decisions in the Amos, Gouled, and
Agnello cases, the court could properly refuse to exclude
evidence obtained on a search or seizure which the Government's own evidence shows to have been in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, even though there had been ample
opportunity to make a motion to suppress and such motion
was not made. The refusal to entertain a motion to suppress evidence during the trial is because the court will not
stop the trial to inquire into a collateral issue. Where the
Government's own evidence shows the search or seizure
invalid no inquiry is necessary. An objection to evidence
or a motion to strike may be ruled upon without halting the
trial. To refuse to reject the evidence upon proper objection under those circumstances would be to place a mere
rule of procedure above the constitutional rights of the accused, which is precisely what is condemned in the Amos,
Gouled, and Agnello cases.
On the other hand, it may fairly be said that one acting
as counsel for an accused, who fails to promptly make a
motion or petition to suppress evidence obtained in violation
of the constitutional rights of the accused is risking both
his client's liberty and his own standing at the bar.
11
12

294 Fed. 769 (1924).
291 Fed. 493 (1923).
1
299 Fed. 235 (1924).
14 299 Fed. 281 (1924).
15 4 Fed. (2d) 527 (1925).
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The Segurola case was decided in 1927. The opinion of
Chief Justice Taft, in that case, might be said to indicate
that in his opinion the right after trial commenced to raise
the question of illegal search or seizure is limited to cases
where there was no opportunity to present the matter a'
an earlier period of the proceedings. However, he was stating the general rule only and can scarcely be deemed to have
overruled the Amos, Gouled, and Agnello cases, or to hold
that the court will ignore violations of constitutional rights
where such violations are shown by the Government's own
evidence.
The matter may be summarized thus:
(a) The general rule is that in order to be timely a motion to suppress must be made before the commencement of
trial.
(b) If the Government's own evidence shows that the
search or seizure was in violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused, the question may be raised when that fact
appears.
(c) If'the accused does not learn until during the trial
that the Government possesses evidence obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights, his action to suppress is timely
if made as soon as he learns of that fact, which is usually at
the time the evidence is offered against him.
It will be seen that the courts of the United States have
been vigilant and their action has been effective in the protection of rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The procedure is fairly simple and is always available. Its purpose and object, however, is to extend the
protection of the Fifth Amendment to those whose rights
under the Fourth have been violated. The most prolific
source of confusion (and of argument) has been the failure
of advocates to distinguish between such searches and seizures as are reasonable, and such as are unreasonable.
John Jones.
Ironwood, Michigan.

